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ABSTRACT 
A multi-parameter sensitivity analysis of a Bayesian network (BN) used in the digital forensic 
investigation of the Yahoo! email case has been performed using the principle of ‘steepest gradient’ in 
the parameter space of the conditional probabilities. This procedure delivers a more reliable result for 
the dependence of the posterior probability of the BN on the values used to populate the conditional 
probability tables (CPTs) of the BN.  As such, this work extends our previous studies using single-
parameter sensitivity analyses of BNs, with the overall aim of more deeply understanding the 
indicative use of BNs within the digital forensic and prosecutorial processes. In particular, we find that 
while our previous conclusions regarding the Yahoo! email case are generally validated by the results 
of the multi-parameter sensitivity analysis, the utility of performing the latter analysis as a means of 
verifying the structure and form adopted for the Bayesian network should not be underestimated. 
Keywords: Bayesian network; digital forensics; multi-parameter sensitivity analysis; steepest 
gradient. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The use of Bayesian networks (BNs) to assist in digital forensic investigations of e-crimes is 
continuing to increase [Kwan, 2008; Kwan, 2010; Kwan, 2011] since they offer a valuable means of 
reasoning about the relationship between the recovered (or expected) digital evidential traces and the 
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forensic sub-hypotheses that explain how the suspected e-crime was committed [Kwan, 2008]. 
One of the principal difficulties encountered in constructing BNs is to know what conditional 
probability values are appropriate for populating the conditional probability tables (CPTs) that are 
found at each node of the BN. These values can be estimated by means of a survey questionnaire of a 
group of experienced experts [Kwan , 2008] but as such they are always open to challenge. There are 
also a number of alternative methods for estimating CPT values, including reasoning from historical 
databases, but none are entirely exempt from the potential criticism of lacking quantitative rigour. In 
these circumstances it is important to know how sensitive the posterior output of the BN is to the 
numerical values of these parameters. If the degree of sensitivity can be shown to be low then the 
precise values adopted for these parameters is not critical to the stability of the posterior output of the 
BN. 
In this paper we generalize the concept of sensitivity value introduced by Renooij and van der Gaag 
[Renooij, 2004] to a multi-parameter space and adapt the concept of steepest gradient from the domain 
of numerical optimization to define a local multi-parameter sensitivity value in the region of the 
chosen parameter set. This metric defines the steepest gradient at the chosen point in the parameter 
space, which is a direct measure of the local multi-parameter sensitivity of the BN. It should be 
emphasised that in this work we are not aiming to optimize either the conditional probabilities or the 
posterior output of the BN as was the case with the multi-parameter optimization scheme of Chan and 
Darwiche [Chan, 2004]; our objective here is to measure the stability of the latter with respect to 
simultaneous small variations of the former by determining the steepest local gradient in the multi-
parameter space. 
2. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
A number of types of BN sensitivity analysis have been proposed. The most straightforward, although 
tedious, is the direct manipulation method which involves the iterative variation of one parameter at a 
time, keeping all the others fixed. This single-parameter approach was used to demonstrate the low 
sensitivity of the BitTorrent BN in [Overill, 2010]. Three somewhat more sophisticated approaches to 
single-parameter sensitivity analysis, namely, bounding sensitivity analysis, sensitivity value analysis 
and vertex likelihood analysis were proposed in [Renooij, 2004], and were each applied to the Yahoo! 
Email BN to demonstrate its low sensitivity in [Kwan, 2011]. However, a valid criticism of each of 
these single-parameter approaches is that the effect of simultaneous variation of the parameters is not 
considered. The multi-parameter sensitivity analysis scheme proposed in [Chan, 2004] requires the 
determination of k
th
-order partial derivatives with an associated computational complexity of 
O(n in order to perform a k-way sensitivity analysis on a BN of tree-width w with n 
parameters where F(Xi) is the size of CPT i. In order to develop a computationally tractable approach 
to local multi-parameter BN sensitivity analysis, we have generalized the original concept of the 
single-parameter sensitivity value [Renooij, 2004] to multi-parameter space and then applied the 
steepest gradient approach from numerical optimization to produce a metric for the local (or 
instantaneous)  multi-parameter sensitivity value at the selected point in parameter space. 
3. YAHOO! CASE (HONG KONG) 
3.1 Background of Yahoo! Case (Hong Kong) 
On April 20, 2004, Chinese journalist Shi Tao used his private Yahoo! email account and sent a brief 
of Number 11 document which was released by the Chinese government that day, to an overseas web 
site called Asia Democracy Foundation. When the Chinese government found it out, Beijing State 
Security Bureau requested the e-mail service provider, Yahoo! Holdings (Hong Kong) to provide 
details of the sender’s personal information, like identifying information, login times, and e-mail 
contents. According to Article 45 of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law (“Article 45”), Yahoo! Holding 
(Hong Kong) was legally obliged to comply with the demand. Mr. Shi was accused with the crime of 
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“providing state secrets to foreign entities.” After the course of investigation, Mr. Shi was convicted 
and sentenced to ten years in prison in 2005 [Case No. 29, 2005]. 
In [Cap.486, 2007], it mentioned that: 
“In the verdict (the “Verdict”) delivered by the People’s Court on 27 April 2005, it stated that Mr. 
Shi had on 20 April 2004 at approximately 11:32 p.m. leaked information to “an overseas hostile 
element, taking advantage of the fact that he was working overtime alone in his office to connect 
to the internet through his phone line and used his personal email account (huoyan-
1989@yahoo.com.cn) to send his notes. He also used the alias ‘198964’ as the name of the 
provider …”. The Verdict reported the evidence gathered to prove the commission of the offence 
which included the following: “Account holder information furnished by Yahoo! Holdings (Hong 
Kong) Ltd., which confirms that for IP address 218.76.8.21 at 11:32:17 p.m. on April 20, 2004, 
the corresponding user information was as follows: user telephone number: 0731-4376362 located 
at the Contemporary Business News office in Hunan; address: 2F, Building 88, Jianxing New 
Village, Kaifu District, Changsha.” 
3.2 Digital Evidence in Yahoo! Case (Hong Kong) 
From the above verdict, we can tell that the information provided by Yahoo! Holdings (Hong Kong) 
Ltd. is taken as the digital evidences in the court.  Since we utilize a Bayesian Network as our analysis 
model, we have to construct a Hypothesis-Evidence system. In this case, the main (or root) hypothesis 
is: 
Hypothesis H0: “The seized computer has been used to send the material document as an 
email attachment via a Yahoo! Web mail account” 
Under the main hypothesis, we have six sub-hypotheses and their corresponding evidences which are 
listed below: 
 
Table 1  Sub-hypothesis H1: Linkage between the 
material document and the suspect’s computer. 
Table 2  Sub-hypothesis H2: Linkage between the 
suspect and his computer. 
 
ID Description Evidence 
Type 
DE1 
The subject document exists 
in the computer 
Digital 
DE2 
The “Last Access Time” of 
the subject file lags behind 
the IP address assignment 
time by the ISP 
Digital 
DE3 
The “Last Access Time” of 
the subject file lags behind 
or closes to the sent time of 
the Yahoo! email 
Digital 
 
ID Description Evidence 
Type 
PE1 
The suspect was in physical 
possession of the computer 
Physical 
DE4 
Files in the computer reveals 
the identity of the suspect 
Digital 
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Table 3  Sub-hypothesis H3: Linkage between the 
suspect and the ISP 
Table 4  Sub-hypothesis H4: Linkage between the 
suspect and Yahoo! email account 
 
ID Description Evidence 
Type 
DE5 
The ISP subscription details 
(including the assigned IP 
address) matches the 
suspect’s particulars  
Digital 
 
ID Description Evidence 
Type 
DE6 
The subscription details 
(including the IP address 
that sent the email) of the 
Yahoo! email account 
matches the suspect’s 
particulars 
Digital 
 
 
Table 5  Sub-hypothesis H5: Linkage between the 
computer and the ISP 
Table 6  Sub-hypothesis H6: Linkage between the 
computer and Yahoo! email account 
 
ID Description Evidence 
Type 
DE7 
Configuration setting of the 
ISP Internet account is 
found in the computer 
Digital 
DE8 
Log data confirms that the 
computer was powered up 
at the time when the email 
was sent 
Digital 
DE9 
Web browsing program 
(e.g. Internet Explorer) or 
email user agent program 
(e.g. Outlook) is found 
activated at the time the 
email was sent  
Digital 
DE10 
Log data reveals the 
assigned IP address and the 
assignment time by the ISP 
to the computer 
Digital 
DE11 
ISP confirms the 
assignment of the IP 
address to the suspect’s 
account 
Digital 
 
ID Description Evidence 
Type 
DE12 
Internet history logs reveal 
the access of the Yahoo! 
email account by the 
computer 
Digital 
DE13 
Internet cached files reveal 
the subject document has 
been sent as an attachment 
via the Yahoo! email 
account 
Digital 
DE14 
Yahoo! confirms the IP 
address of the Yahoo! 
email with the attached 
document 
Digital 
 
3.3 CPT values for Sub-Hypothesis and Evidence in Yahoo! Case (Hong Kong) 
Before we set up the Bayesian Network, we have to obtain the CPT values of sub-hypothesis and 
evidence.  In this study, all of the probability values are assigned by subjective beliefs based on expert 
professional opinion and experience in digital forensic analysis [Kwan, 2011]. From Table-7, we can 
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see there are two states for hypothesis H0 – “yes” and “no”, and also for sub-hypotheses H1 to H6. For 
the CPT values between sub-hypothesis and evidence, there are still two states for each sub-hypothesis 
– “yes” and “no”, but three states for each evidence – “yes”, “no” and “uncertain”. State “uncertain” 
means the evidence cannot be concluded to be either positive (“yes”) or negative (“no”) after 
examination of the evidence. 
Table 7 Likelihood value for sub-hypothesis H1 to H6 given hypothesis H 
 H1,  H5, H6 H2,  H3,  H4 
State “yes” “no” “yes” “no” 
H = “yes” 0.65 0.35 0.8 0.2 
H = “no” 0.35 0.65 0.2 0.8 
  
Table 8  Conditional probability values for DE1 to DE3 given 
sub-hypothesis H1 
Table 9 Conditional probability values 
for DE4 given sub-hypothesis H2 
 
 DE1 DE2, DE3 
State yes no u yes no u 
H1 = yes 0.85 0.15 0 0.8 0.15 0.05 
H1 = no 0.15 0.85 0 0.15 0.8 0.05 
 
 DE4 
State yes no u 
H2 = yes 0.75 0.2 0.05 
H2 = no 0.2 0.75 0.05 
 
Table 10 Conditional probability values for DE5 
given sub-hypothesis H3 
Table 11 Conditional probability values for DE6 
given sub-hypothesis H4 
 
 DE5 
State yes no u 
H3 = yes 0.7 0.25 0.05 
H3 = no 0.25 0.7 0.05 
 
 DE6 
State yes no u 
H4 = yes 0.1 0.85 0.05 
H4 = no 0.05 0.9 0.05 
 
Table 12  Conditional probability values for DE7 to DE11 given sub-hypothesis H5 
 DE7, DE8, DE10 DE9, DE11 
State yes no u yes no u 
H5 = yes 0.7 0.25 0.05 0.8 0.15 0.05 
H5 = no 0.25 0.7 0.05 0.15 0.8 0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2012 
 
134 
Table 13  Conditional probability values for DE12 to DE14 given sub-hypothesis H6 
 DE12, DE13 DE14 
State yes no u yes no u 
H6 = yes 0.7 0.25 0.05 0.8 0.15 0.05 
H6 = no 0.25 0.7 0.05 0.15 0.8 0.05 
 
4. LOCAL MULTI-PARAMETER SENSITIVITY VALUE 
4.1 Conditional Independence 
Before we proceed with the multi-parameter sensitivity value, we have to discuss the relationship 
between each sub-hypothesis and its set of evidences. In the Yahoo! case, the connections between 
sub-hypothesis and evidences belong to the class of diverging connections in a Bayesian network 
[Taroni, 2006] (see Figure 1). In a diverging connection model, E1 and E2 are conditionally 
independent given H. This means that: (1) with the knowledge of H, the state of E1 does not change 
the belief about the possible states of E2. ; (2) without the 
knowledge of H, the state of E1 provides information about the possible states of E2. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Diverging Connection Bayesian Network 
In general, we cannot conclude that E1 and E2 are also conditionally independent given . However, 
for some special cases, if there are only two possible (mutually complementary) values for H, H={H1, 
H2}, then given “H=H1”, E1 and E2 are conditionally independent, while, given “H=H2”, E1 and E2 are 
also conditionally independent. Hence we can conclude that E1 and E2 are also conditionally 
independent given . 
4.2 Multi-Parameter Sensitivity Value 
Under the standard assumption of proportional co-variation [Renooij, 2004] the theorems 
characterizing the algebraic structure of marginal probabilities [Castillo, 1997] permit the single-
parameter sensitivity function of [Renooij, 2004] to be generalized to the multi-parameter case as 
follows: 
If the parameters are given by x = (x1, …, xn)  then the sensitivity function F is given by the multi-
linear quotient: 
 
The components of the gradient vector are given by: 
 
 
 
H 
E1 E2 
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The multi-parameter sensitivity value is the value of the steepest gradient at the point x and is given by 
the Euclidean norm of the gradient vector : 
 
This last result follows from the first order Taylor expansion of F: 
   (4) 
In principle the multi-linear forms in the numerator and the denominator of F are both of order n and 
contain 2
n 
terms leading to expressions for each  containing 2
2n
 terms in both numerator and 
denominator. However, this analysis does not take into account the conditional dependencies implied 
by the structure of the BN. If the BN can be represented as a set of m sub-hypotheses Hj (j=1, m), each 
of which is conditionally dependent on a disjoint subset Ei (i=1, n) containing nj (j=1,m) of the set of n 
evidential traces, so that , then the total number of parameters is given by , 
but each Hj is conditionally dependent only upon its own subset of nj evidential traces. This is known 
as the local Markov property of the BN. Although the conditional probabilities associated with sub-
hypothesis Hj will influence those associated with sub-hypothesis Hk (j≠k) via the process of 
Bayesian inference propagation through the network [Kwan, 2008], to a reasonable first 
approximation the sensitivity values for each sub-hypothesis may be evaluated by disregarding these 
indirect effects. Then, for the sub-hypotheses is a multi-linear quotient of order m, while for the 
evidential traces associated with sub-hypothesis Hj  is a multi-linear quotient of order nj. The 
Markov factorisation of the BN thus substantially reduces the number of terms involved in the 
expressions for and . Nevertheless a symbolic algebraic manipulation program, such as 
MatLab [MathWorks, 2011], is required to perform the differentiations and computations reliably for a 
BN representing a real-world situation such as the Yahoo! email case. 
In order to derive the coefficients of the multinomial quotient for  we proceed as follows. Bayes’ 
formula for the likelihood conditional probability is: 
 
Considering the conjunctive combination of the evidential traces {E1, E2, …, En}, (5) transforms into: 
 
Then we obtain the multi-parameter posterior probability as: 
 
Here,  
 
As mentioned in Section 4.1, given H, E1, E2, …, En are conditionally independent of each other. 
Therefore, 
 
According to the definition of conditional independence, we cannot in general assume that E1, E2, …, 
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En are conditionally independent of each other under . However, in the specific Yahoo! email case, 
there are only two possible (mutually complementary) states for each hypothesis. Therefore, we also 
have: 
 
Denoting , , …,  by x1, x2, … xn, and , , …,  
by c1, c2, … cn, we obtain the multi-parameter Sensitivity Function as: 
 
As an un-biased pre-condition, it is usual to take the prior probabilities as: 
, so (11) simplifies to: 
 
When finding the sensitivity value of the posterior of the root node H0, it is necessary to use a variant 
of (3), namely, the weighted Euclidean norm of the sensitivity values of the individual sub-hypotheses: 
 
where  is the multi-parameter sensitivity value of sub-hypothesis is the multi-parameter 
sensitivity value of sub-hypothesis j as given by (3),  reflecting the different contributions of the 
individual sub-hypotheses to the posterior of H0. 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In Table 14 the multi-parameter sensitivity values for each sub-hypothesis of BN for the Yahoo! case 
[Kwan, 2011] are set out and compared with the corresponding single-parameter sensitivity values 
from [Kwan, 2011]. Before proceeding to discuss these results, however, it should be mentioned at 
this point that while validating the MatLab code for the multi-parameter sensitivity values, a number 
of numerical discrepancies were noted when reproducing the previously reported single-parameter 
sensitivity values ([Kwan, 2011], Table 4). All but one of these discrepancies are not numerically 
significant in terms of the conclusions drawn; however, in the case of digital evidential trace DE6 the 
correct sensitivity value is actually 2.222, not 0.045, which implies that the effect of DE6 on the 
posterior of H4 should be significant. This revised result brings the single-parameter sensitivity value 
for DE6 into line with the vertex proximity value for DE6 ([Kwan, 2011], Table 5) which indicated that 
the posterior of H4 is indeed sensitive to variations in DE6, thereby resolving the apparent 
disagreement between the two sensitivity metrics for the case of DE6 noted in [Kwan, 2011]. The 
corrected results for the single-parameter sensitivity values are given in Table 14 below.  However, a 
review of sub-hypothesis H4 reveals that it is not critical to the prosecution case since its associated 
evidence DE6 is only weakly tied into the case; the fact that  Mr Shi registered with Yahoo!  for a 
webmail account at some time in the past cannot be assigned a high probative value and this is 
reflected in the ‘non-diagonal’ structure of the corresponding CPT (see Table 11), unlike all the other 
CPTs in this BN. 
It is reasonable to interpret the significance of a sensitivity value by comparing it with unity [Renooij, 
2004; Kwan, 2011]; a value below unity implies a lack of sensitivity to small changes in the associated 
conditional probability parameters, and vice versa. In other words, a sensitivity value less than unity 
implies that the response of the BN is smaller than the applied perturbation. It cannot be assumed that 
single-parameter sensitivity values as computed in [Kwan, 2011] are necessarily either smaller or 
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larger than the corresponding multi-parameter sensitivity values computed here, since the form of the 
sensitivity function being used is not identical. In the Yahoo! email case, three of the sub-hypotheses, 
namely H2, H3 and H4, are associated with only a single evidential trace so each of their sensitivity 
values is unchanged in the multi-parameter analysis. Of the three remaining sub-hypotheses, H1 and H6 
both have three associated evidential traces whereas H5 has five.  
Table 14: Single- and multi-parameter sensitivity values for H1 – H6 of the Yahoo! email case 
Sub-hypothesis 
Digital 
Evidence 
Single-parameter 
Sensitivity value 
Component j 
 of Multi-
parameter 
Sensitivity value 
Multi-parameter 
Sensitivity value 
H1 
DE1 0.1500 0.0125 
0.0225 DE2 0.1662 0.0134 
DE3 0.1662 0.0134 
H2 DE4 0.2216 0.2216 0.2216 
H3 DE5 0.2770 0.2770 0.2770 
H4 DE6 2.2222 2.2222 2.2222 
H5 
DE7 0.2770 0.0051 
 
 
0.0110 
DE8 0.2770 0.0051 
DE9 0.1662 0.0045 
DE10 0.2770 0.0051 
DE11 0.1662 0.0045 
H6 
DE12 0.2770 0.0565 
0.0939 DE13 0.2770 0.0565 
DE14 0.1662 0.0494 
 
From Table 14 it will be noted that, with the exception of the somewhat anomalous case of H4 
discussed earlier, the largest multi-parameter sensitivity value is an order of magnitude smaller than 
the smallest of the single-parameter sensitivity values  reported previously [Kwan, 2011]. This finding 
is at first sight somewhat surprising in that it might be expected that permitting many parameters to 
vary simultaneously would produce the opportunity for greater sensitivity values to be found. 
However, it must be remembered that, unlike the case of classical numerical optimization, the 
parameters of the BN are not completely independent due to the conditional independence referred to 
in Section 4.1 as well as the interdependence produced by the propagation of belief (posterior 
probabilities) through the BN [Kwan, 2008]. In certain circumstances, these forms of co-variance can 
result in smaller multi-parameter sensitivity values than might otherwise have been anticipated, as 
explained below.  
In Table 15 we give the single- and multi-parameter sensitivity values for the root node H0. The multi-
parameter sensitivity value is computed using the weighted Euclidean norm given in (12). 
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Table 15: Single- and multi-parameter sensitivity values for H0 of the Yahoo! email case 
Root 
hypothesis 
Sub-
hypothesis 
Single-
parameter 
Sensitivity 
value 
Component 
 of 
Multi-
parameter 
Sensitivity 
value 
Weight of 
Component 
 
Multi-
parameter 
Sensitivity 
value 
 
 
H0 
H1 0.3500 0.0064 0.0225 
 
 
 
0.0052 
H2 0.2000 0.0030 0.2216 
H3 0.2000 0.0030 0.2770 
H4 0.2000 0.0030 2.2222 
H5 0.3500 0.0037 0.0110 
H6 0.3500 0.0037 0.0939 
 
The multi-parameter sensitivity results in Tables 14 and 15 raise a number of important issues for 
discussion.  Firstly, it appears that a multi-parameter sensitivity analysis should be performed in every 
case in which a BN is used to reason about digital evidence. Since a multi-parameter sensitivity 
analysis can often yield substantially different sensitivity values from a single-parameter sensitivity 
analysis, it is necessary to assess the sensitivity of the posterior output of the BN as rigorously as 
possible before putting forward forensic conclusions based on that BN. In the present Yahoo! email 
case we found consistently smaller multi-parameter sensitivity values than the corresponding single-
parameter results, but further investigations have shown that this is by no means a universal trend. By 
creating CPTs with different ratios of ‘diagonal’ to ‘off-diagonal’ values we have been able to explore 
the circumstances under which the multi-parameter sensitivity analysis is likely to yield larger values 
than the corresponding single-parameter analysis. Table 16 offers a few such examples. In particular 
we find that when the structure of one or more CPT tables deviates significantly from the typical 
‘diagonal’ form, as was the case with H4-DE6 here, then the single- and multi-parameter sensitivity 
values will increase towards and quite possibly exceed unity. This observation can be understood as 
follows: A typically ‘diagonal’ CPT signifies that the truth or falsehood of the sub-hypothesis strongly 
predicts the presence or absence of the associated evidence; they are logically tightly-coupled, which 
is a highly desirable property. An anomalously ‘non-diagonal’ CPT, however, signals that there is 
little correlation between the truth of the sub-hypothesis and the presence or absence of the evidence. 
In other words, the evidence is a very poor indicator of the truth of the sub-hypothesis, and does not 
discriminate effectively. This manifests itself as a steep gradient on the associated CPT parameters’ 
hyper-surface indicating the direction of a ‘better’ choice of parameters.  Similarly, a combination of 
‘diagonal’ and ‘non-diagonal’ CPTs associated with the same sub-hypothesis can create a numerical 
tension or balance between the belief reinforcing effects propagated by the former and the belief 
weakening effects propagated by the latter, resulting in an increased sensitivity value. 
Secondly, the above observations lead us to propose that single- and multi-parameter sensitivity 
analyses can be effectively employed to test an existing BN for logical consistency between its sub-
hypotheses and their associated evidences, through the CPT values. If the single- or multi-parameter 
sensitivity analysis results suggest that the BN’s posterior output is sensitive to the values of one of 
more of the BN’s CPTs, it is necessary to review those CPT values critically with a view to possibly 
revising them, after which the single- or multi-parameter sensitivity analysis should be repeated. It 
should be noted, however, that this is not equivalent to optimizing the posterior output BN with 
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respect to the CPT values. Rather, it is using the sensitivity analysis to highlight possible issues in the 
process by which the original CPT values were generated. If repeated reviews of the CPT values do 
not lead to a stable posterior output from the BN, this would suggest that the structure of the BN or of 
the underlying sub-hypotheses and their associated evidential traces concerning the way in which the 
digital crime was committed, may be faulty and require revision. We recall that this was the case with 
H4-DE6 in the present study. Note, in particular, that the single-parameter sensitivity results in Table 
16 would not necessarily cause concern, while the corresponding multi-parameter results clearly 
indicate a serious sensitivity problem. Hence we contend that in general single-parameter sensitivity 
analyses are not sufficient in and of themselves and we recommend that multi-parameter sensitivity 
analyses should be undertaken as a matter of course. 
A final, and more general, consideration is whether there are any special characteristics of digital 
forensic analysis which would dictate that the requirements of a sensitivity analysis should differ from 
traditional forensics. Because digital forensics is a much more recent discipline than most of 
traditional forensics there has been less time for it to establish a corpus of verified knowledge and a 
‘track record’ of demonstrably sound methodologies. This means that digital forensics needs to strive 
to establish itself as a mature scientific and engineering discipline, and routinely performing sensitivity 
analyses is one means of helping to achieve this goal. Indeed, it may result in the analytical methods of 
traditional forensics being required to proceed in a similar fashion in order to avoid the imputation of 
‘reasonable doubt’ by wily defence lawyers. 
Table 16: Some examples of other CPT values yielding large multi-parameter sensitivity values 
Sub-
hypothesis 
Digital 
Evidence  
 
 
Single-
parameter 
Sensitivity 
value 
Multi-
parameter 
Sensitivity value 
H1 
DE1 0.7 0.3 0.300 
2.4448 
DE2 0.3 0.7 0.300 
DE3 0.3 0.65 0.7202 
DE4 0.7 0.25 0.2770 
H2 
DE5 0.6 0.3 0.3704 
1.8680 DE6 0.3 0.65 0.7202 
DE7 0.4 0.55 0.6094 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have described a multi-parameter sensitivity analysis on the BN from the Yahoo! 
email case. . As a result of the present analysis, it can be concluded that one the Yahoo! email sub-
hypotheses (H4) exhibits a significant degree of single- and multi-parameter sensitivity and hence its 
associated evidence and conditional probabilities should be reviewed. That review indicated that while 
the CPT was in fact quite accurate, it represented a poor choice of evidence and sub-hypothesis which 
should either be discarded or revised. 
More generally, we have shown that the definition and computation of local multi-parameter 
sensitivity values is made feasible for BNs describing real-world digital crimes by the use of a 
symbolic algebra system such as Matlab [MathWorks, 2011] to evaluate the steepest gradient 
analytically.  
Finally, we should reiterate that the principal aim of this work is to devise a metric to assess the 
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instantaneous (or local) stability of a BN with respect to the values chosen to populate its CPTs. The 
value of such a metric is that it enables the digital forensic examiner to know whether or not the set of 
conditional probabilities chosen to populate the CPTs of the BN lies on a flat or a steep part of the 
hyper-surface in parameter space. The problem of attempting to find local (or global) optima on the 
parametric hyper-surface of a BN is a separate issue which has been addressed elsewhere [CD04]. 
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